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"\j ~ u<"\t_ TUCKER Timely 
:::;., ~ ~ 1, Resp was convicted of rape after a jury trial in 
:1,,.,-~~Mich state court and was sentenced to 20-40 yrs imprisonment, 
;~ ::; • ?n appeal his c_onviction was. affirmed unanimously by the / . 
l~ ~,,..M Mich Ct of Appeals and the Mi.ch Sup Ct. The E.D. Mich {f L 
~ .;ft- . 
J- ~16 (Freeman) then granted habeas relief holding that the ~ 
testimony of a witness who was discovered through ~ ments 
made by petr to police after insufficient Mira nda warnings 
should have been excluded. CA 6 aff·irmed by order and 




1. Facts On April 19, 1966 (Mirm:la was 6/13/66) a previously 
chaste 43 old woman was found ra~ed, beaten and bound, by 
police in her •h~me. A dog 1 not belonging to the victim1 
was in the home when the police arrived and when the 
dog was let out by the police it wondered over to a 
nearby home. After questioning some neighbors the 
pplice discovered that petr lived in the home where the 
dog went. Petr was then taken down to the station for 
questioning. At police headquarters, scratches were observed -----on petr•s face and blood was found on his clothes and 
undershorts. Prior to interrogating petr, the police 
advised him that he had a right to remain silent and the 
,e right _to contact a lawyer. He was ~ advised of his right 
.,, ~ - to a court appointed attorney. Petr agreed to talk 
7 ::: :::::::::,::1:::1:::::::e:::::::::~:.w::: :n::i:~:• 
he refute petr's alibi, he told the police that shortly 
after the ' time of the rape petr came to his house. Henderson 
stated that he asked petr how he got the scratches on 
his face and whether it was "a wild one or something." 
Petr replied "something like that." Henderson then asked 
who it was and the petr replied "She's a widow woma n who 
was in her thirties and lived the next block over." 
-Henderson testified as to these statements at trial 
) 
· ) 
even th9ugh iD ~was stipulated that knowledge of Henderson 
was obtained solely through petr's statements to the police. 
The petr 's t ria l took pla ce a f ter the Mira nda decision, 
·-
-3-
(Miranda applies to .all trials held after the date of the 
decision, Johnson v, N.J.,384 U.S. 719) and the trial court 
found that eetr's statements to the police were inadmissable 
because of inadequate warnings. The state trial ct and 
~ 
both state appeal courts held, however, that tlenderson'~ 
testimony was admissible even though it was a "fruit of 
the poison9us tree." 
Decisions below After exhausting stat~ remedies, petr 
filed this §2254 action in the E.D.Mich and relief was 
there granted. The D.Ct. (opinion p 14 of cert petn) 
noted that the s.Ct has held ·the"fruits"of 4th Am violations 
(Wong Sun) and 6th Am violations (Wade and Gilbert) inadmis-
sible and in Harrison v. u.s,, 392 U.S. 219, the Ct 
held that testimony of an accused ~ould not be admitted 
at a subsequent trial where the testimony at the first 
-
trial was induced by use of accused's confession taken in 
violation of the 5th Am. Footnote nine of Harrison explicitly 
----- ______________, 
reserved the issue sub judice~ 
"We have no occasion in this case to canvass the complex 
and varied problems that arise when the trial testimony 
of a witness other t~an the accused is challenged as 1 the 
evidentary product of the poisened -tree." 
On the basis of the above-cited cases, the D.Ct concluded 
tha:: Henderson•s testimony was an ina dmissible fruit of 
a Miranda violation. The D.Ct distinguished Harris v. 
lis.X..t_, 401 U.S. 222 1 by noting that the ·-Miranda-violative 
statements in that case were only held admissible to 
impeach on cross-examination and not in the prosecution's 
case-in-chief. Responding to the obviously relevant dissent 
j 
-
require the extra increment 
in that case, the D.Ct repl eds 
Miranda did not 
deterrent thct: was gained 
"Whatever the motivation of a government agent in failing x1 
to warn a defendant, the government should not be allowed 
to benefit from the violation of defendant's rights." 
I 
The Ct also found it irrelevant that petr•s statements 
were exculpatory rather than inculpatory and that the 
~ ~
tes~ mony at issue was given by a t~ird person rather 
than defendant himself. (citing Wade and Gilbert which 
--------------- . involved 3rd party identification evidence). Finally, 
-------the D.Ct found that the error was not harmless. In a 
'------------c--:----=--------------
short opinion CA 6 affirmed the D.Ct. noting "we are 
in full agreement with the opiniori of the D.Ct." 
3. Contentions Petr relies primarily on two CADC 
decisions written or joined by then Judge Burger that 
held the exclusionary rule inapplicable to this situation. 
Smith v. U.S. 324 F.2d 879 (1963)r ~n v. U.S. 375 F.2d 
310 (1967)~ Noting that the Ct itself has viewed this 
-:::__ 
issue as unresolved (fn 9 in Harrison, supra) and that 
"a vicious rapist"will be set free if the CA is allowed to 
stand, petr argues that the Ct should grant cert. Petr 
also argues that the mere failure of the police to advise 
petr of his right to a court appointed lawyer did not 
render these exculpatory statements involuntary and to 
the extent Miranda mandates that result, Miranda is wrong. 
In a one page response 1resp arg~es that "a ruling by 
this Ct on the issue raised by petr would not be dispositve 
of this case" because several other contentions were raised 
·p 
-5-
below by resp that were not passed on by the D.Ct. [I fail 
to see the relevance of this]. Resp also notes that 
a recent Mich Ct, of App opinion, People v. Robinson,210NW2d 372, 
was denied review by the Mich Sup Ct and that there the 
law of Mich. was made to conform to nhe decision of 
CA 6 in this case. Finally, resp mentions that CA 6 was 
correct. 
4. Discussion The facts leave resp in a rather 
unsympathetic posture and assuming the Ct is not inclined 
to extend Miranda, CA 6 will have to be corrected. The --Ct has never decided that witnes·ses discovered through 
Miranda-violative interrogation cannot testify and as 
noted, _the question was left unresolved in Harrison. 
If the Ct does wish to reverse CA 6 .it _ would not -be 
necessa ry to make serious inroads on Miranda inasmuch 
as a)this was the testimony of a 3rd party, not the def 
that was excluded: b) the wanings were almost perfect 
and it is difficult to call these statments "involuntary"; 
and c) the' statements were exculpatory. 
There is a response 
11/12/73 Richter CA, . DoCt, and state ct ops 
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Motion~ of Resp for 
Appointment of Counsel 
and to permit ennet M. 
Mogill to argue .E.!E_ hac vice 
The Court granted cert to CA 6 in this case on December 3 to 
c.ohsider the admissibility of third party testimony dis covered as a result 
of an improper Miranda interrogation. The Court also granted resp1 s 
motion to proceed IFP. 
Through counsel, resp requests that Kenneth M. Mogill of Detroit 
be appointed to represent him before this Court. Mr. Mogill was admitted 
to practice before the Michigan SC in November, 1971. His practice is 
~·' ... - . . 
✓-
- 2 -
devoted almost exclusively to criminal trial and appellate law. H e has 
I 
tried numerous capital cases, argued before the Mich. CA and ha s 
written numerous briefs in the Mich. SC. Counsel has also taught classes 
in criminal law at the University of Michigan, Wayne State University, 
Eastern Michigan University a.rid at two bar sponsored seminars. 
Mr. Mogill has represented resp as appointed counsel below, 
prepared the Brief in Opposition to the cert petition and the brief of resp 
on the merits. He is the only attorney completely familiar with the record 
in this case. 
Counsel states that in view of the substantial amount of time he 
has expended preparing the briefs in this case, he is willing to proceed 
as resp' s attorney at his own expense if the Motion for Appointment is 
denied. 
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The issue in this case is whether the exclusionary 
rule should have been applied to exclude the testimony of a 
witness when that witness was discovered through a Miranda-
violative interrogation of the defendant himself. The crucial 
twist to the case is added by the fact that the interrogation 
occurred prior to Miranda and was proper when conducted, but 
since the trial occurred after Miranda, under Johnson v. New 
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) Miranda was applied. 
In view of the fact that ( 1) the interrogation occurred 
prior to Miranda, (2) the violation was a technical one only 
(he was not told of his right to appointed counsel), and (3) it is 
unquestioned but that resp's statements were voluntarily given, '--=--------_:.----------=--=--
it would seem that reversal is strongly mandated. Nonetheless, 
I am firmly of the view that the rationale of Miranda is valid and 
important, and have endeavored both for that reason and because 
of the principle of stare decisis to find a method of reversing 
the case which will avoid doing unnecessary damage to 
Miranda. As I will argue, there is, rather, no reason to 
apply the Miranda - exclusionary rule to this case. After 
explaining my proposed disposition of the case, I will elaborate 
four other possible bases upon which to reverse the case. 
-
2 
Basically, Miranda dictates the exclusion of evidence 
obtained in violation thereof for three possible reasons: 
( 1) statements or confessions obtained in violation thereof 
are thought to have a high potential for unreliability in view 
of the subtle and at times not so subtle coercive pressures which 
t'., 
may be brought to bear by the polic~ on one who is detained 
or in custody. (2) the rule is seen as a means of deterring 
the police from engaging in blatantly improper conduct in 
obtaining such statements, and (3) the more general notion 
that a person should not be convicted on the basis of improper 
government conduct. 
Applying the final and most general rationale first, 
it seems clear that the conviction here was not in fact 
obtained by the use of improper police techniques in any 
way. The police behavior here was not only in compliance with 
the then-existing law when the interrogation itself was conducted, 
but in view of the warnings given.,was probably exemplary. 
Accordingly, the integrity of the process is really not involved 
in this case in view of the pre-Miranda interrogation. 
Applying the first principle, it seems there is little 
risk of unreliability with respect to these statements. This 
is so because (1) it seems that on the facts of this case the 
exculpatory statement given by resp himself was clearly 
voluntarily given, and much more importantly, (2) the evidence the 
-
3 
court sought to exclude was not the "coerced" statements of the 
defendant but rather the voluntary testimony at trial of a -
third per son. Whenever one is dealing with the "fruits " of the 
defendant's statements, rather than the statements themselves, 
the fear of unreliability is effectively nullified, though other 
concerns, as discussed below, do persist. It is the fear of 
unreliability which to my mind is the most vital underlying 
rationale for Miranda and the one which I would most strongly --fight to see preserved. The absence of that concern here 
relieves me of the most substantial concerns I would have about 
reversing the case. 
The most-often repeated rationale for the Miranda 
exclusionary rule, though to my mind not the most important, 
is the need to deter improper police conduct by excluding 
evidence obtained thereby. Hand in hand with the notion of 
deterrence, however, goes also the recognition that if the 
police were free to use involuntary statements as leads in 
proceeding against criminal defendants, the Fifth Amendment 
itself would be substantially eroded. See Kastigar v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). In this case, however, the 
statements were made prior to Miranda and the defect in the 





purpose whatsoever is thus served by excluding statements and 
their fruits elicited prior to Miranda obtained by police conduct 
which was proper at the time. Thus, the third rationale also 
seems inapplicable here. 
Accordingly, I would argue that this case is distinguishable 
from Miranda and should be reversed by holding that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply to the fruits of a pre-Miranda 
statement where the statement was its~lf admissable when 
taken. The only remaining hurdle to such a disposition is the 
decision of the Court in Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, which 
held that Miranda applies to all trials held after that decision • 
Johnson appears to have been a compromise between total 
retrospectivity (Gideon) and total prospectivity, (Linkletter). 
The obvious reason for not making the decision totally prospective 
was the desire to avoid any further use of such potentially 
unreliable confessions in subsequent trials, while the reasons 
for not giving it full retrospective application appear to have 
been the fear of unmanageability arising from the large 
number of convictions which would be overturned and the 
absence of any deterrent effect to be gained. In this case, it 
would seem that Johnson can be distinguished and not followed 
precisely because this case is itself distinguishable from Miranda ---and therefore doesn't fall under the Johnson rule1and more 




to invoke the retroactive application of the Miranda rule to 
statements taken prior to Miranda. 
5 
Thus, the case is distinguishable from Miranda and 
Johnson in that it is the fruits and not the actual statements 
themselves which are involved, meaning no reliability problems 
exist and no deterrent purpose would be served since the state-
ments were taken prior to Miranda in any case. Once again, 
"holding would be simply that the exclusionary rule does not 
apply to the fruits of a statement taken prior to Miranda ,which 
was proper and admis sable when taken. 
0~ possible dispositions of the case include the following: 
(1) the most simplistic approach would be simply to overrule 
Miranda outright and return to the pre-Miranda voluntariness 
standard. As noted, this seems both undesirable, in that it 
would increase the likelihood that a person might be convicted on 
the basis of his own unreliable confession or statement, and 
unnecessary in view of the possibility of distinguishing Miranda 
and Johnson. Moreover, in Harrison v. U.S., 392 U.S. 219 
( 1968), the Court explicitly noted that it had not decided this 
issue in Miranda. In holding that the testimony of an accused 
could not be admitted at a subsequent trial where the testimony 





confession, the Court noted: 
we have no occasion in this case to canvass 
the complex and varied problems that arise 
when the trial testimony of a witne ~ er 
th~ d is challenged as ~ e -=::::::::;-
evidentiary product of the poisonous tree. 1 
6 
It seems to me the Court cannot on these facts attempt to decide 
how these iss~es would be re_solved i_f the statements were post-
Miranda, or if the statements rather than the fruits were 
, 
involved, or if improper police misconduct were involved. That 
is simply not this case, and hence Miranda cannot be directly 
·reached here. 
(2) The Court could adopt the recommendation of the 
Calif AG and hold that Miranda issues are not reviewable on 
state habeas. There is some support for such a position in your 
concurrence in Bustamante, although that dealt only with Fourth 
Amendment claims. I think it unwise to follow this course both 
• 
because I believe it to be wrong as a matter of law, and because 
in any case, it would be inappropriate to do so where the issue 
was neither briefed or decided in this or the lower courts. 
(3) The Court could7as petr strongly urges, overrule • 
Johnson v. New Jersey and hold that Miranda applies only to 
confessions taken after the decision, not simply to trials there-
after. While Johnson was 5-4, it seems unwise to toy with a 




(4) Finally, there is a possible disposition with two 
alternatives itself. The first would be simply to follow the 
approach of the Chief Justice in his two CA DC opinions, 
7 
Smith v. U.S., 324 F. 2d 879 (1963) and Brown v. U.S., 375 
F. 2d 310 (1967), and to hold that the exclusionary rule does 
not apply to testimonial fruits as opposed to 1;_h y sical evidence. 
Aside from the obscurity of the logic of this distinction to me, 
it seems to ignore whatever deterrent value the exclusionary 
rule has, though this is of course a substantial question in and of 
itself. Moreover, this distinction was explicitly rejected by 
Justice Brennan for the Court in Wong Sun, 371 U. S. at 484-6 • 
A broader variation of this argument, which comes 
substantially closer to the position I have argued, is suggested 
in a late amicus submission by the SG in which he argues Miranda 
applies only to the actual confessions and statements and not their 
derivative use, or the 11 fruits 11 they produce, be they testimonial 
or otherwise. As I have ar gued, I would not attempt to decide 
whether Miranda applies but rely on the fact that these statements 
w ere elicited prior to Miranda. To adopt the SG' s position would 
mean that even the fruits of gross police misconduc t could be 






Accordingly, I would recommend reversing the case 
on the ground that the exclusionary rule does not apply to the 
fruits of a statement elicited prior to the decision in Miranda 
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No. 73-482 MICHIGAN v. ~
Dear Chief: 
As a result of further consideration of the above 
case, I am now inclined not to go as far as I indicated at 
Conference in terms of the basis of a Court decision at 
this time. 
I will still vote to reverse. This result could 
be reached, I think, on the ground advanced by Potter, 
namely, that there was no violation of the Miranda rule, 
because it had not then been enunciated by this Court. 
Thus, there was no police misconduct and hence no question 
of detering improper police conduct. Or putting it 
differently, there was simply no violation by the police 
of Miranda or any other law. The testimony therefore 
was admissible. 
If we were to decide the case on this narrow 
ground, it would be unnecessarft to address the much broader 
question of the use of "fruits' derived from an interrogation 
which violated the Miranda per se rule. 
The Chief Justice 
CC: The Conference 
LFP/gg 
Sincerely, 
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~J". Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
~ Mr. Justice Powell 
1st DRAFT 
''11 Rehnquist. J. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATm cdated· $L,)1'f __ 
No. 73-482 
State of Michigan, l . . . . d
P t ·t· On Wnt of Cert10ran to the Umte e 1 10ner, 
States Court of Appeals for the 
v. Sixth Circuit. 
Thomas W. Tucker. 
[May -, 1974] 
MH. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case presents the question whether the testimony 
of a witness in respondent's state court trial for rape must 
be excluded simply because police had learned the identity 
of the witness by questioning respondent at a time when 
he was in custody as a suspect, but had not been advised 
that counsel would be appointed for him if he was indi-
gent. The questioning took place before this Court's 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), but 
respondent's trial, at which he was convicted, took place 
afterwards. Under the holding of Johnson v. New Jersey, 
384 U. S. 719 ( 1966) , therefore, the principles of Miranda 
are applicable to this case. The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan reviewed 
petitioner 's claim on a petition for habeas corpus and held 
that the testimony must be excluded.1 The Court of 
Appeals affirmed.2 
I 
On the morning of April 19, 1966, a 43-year-old woman 
in Pontiac, Michigan, was found in her home by a friend 
1 352 F. Supp. 266 (1972), 










MICHIGAN v. TUCKER 
and coworker , Luther White, in serious condition. At 
the time she was found the woman was tied, gagged, and 
partially disrobed. and had been both raped and severely 
beaten. She was unable to tell White anything about. 
her assault at that time and still remains unable to 
recollect what happened. 
While White was attempting to get medical help for 
the victim and to call for the police, he observed a dog 
inside the house. This apparently attracted White's at• 
tention for he knew that the woman did not own a dog 
herself. Later, when talking with police officers, White 
observed the dog a second time, and police followed the 
dog to respondent's house. Neighbors further connected 
the dog with respondent. 
The police then arrested respondent and brought him 
to the police station for questioning. Prior to the actual 
interrogation the police asked respondent whether he 
knew for what crime he had been arrested. whether he 
wanted an attorney, and whether he understood his 
constitutional rights. 3 Respondent replied that he did 
understand the crime for which he was arrested, that he 
did not want an attorney, and that he understood his 
rights.4 The police further advised him that any state~ 
ments he might make could be used against him at a 
later date in court." The police, however. did not advise 
respondent that he would be furnished counsel free of 
charge if he could not pay for such services himself. 
The police then questioned respondent about his activ~ 
ities on the night of the rape and assault. Respondent 
replied that during the general time period at issue he had 
first been with one Robert Hendersou and then later at 
home, alone, asleep. The police sought to confirm thi~ 
3 Transcript of Prehminar;v Hearing, lJ , 9!:l, 
4 Ibid. 
" Ibid , p 99- 100. 
' 
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t!fory by contacting Henderson. but Henderson's story 
served to discredit rather than to bolster respondent's 
account. Henderson acknowledged that respondent had 
been with him on the night of the crime but said that he 
had left at a relatively early time. Furthermore, Hen" 
derson told police that he saw respondent the following 
day and asked him at that time about scratches on his 
face-"asked him if he got hold of a wild one or some• 
thing."" Respondent answered, "[S] omething like 
that." 7 Then, Henderson said, he asked respondent 
"[W]ho it was, '' 8 and respondent said: "[8]ome woman 
lived the next block over,"" adding "She is a widow 
woman" or words to that effect. tn 
These events all occurred prior to the date on which 
this Court handed <lown its decision i11 Miranda v. Ari" 
zona, 384 U.S. 473, but respondent 's trial occurred after-
wards. Prior to trial respondent;s appornted counsel 
made a motion to exclude Henderson 's expected testimony 
because respondent had revealed HP11derson 's identity 
without having received full Miranda warnings. Al-
though respondent 's own statements takeu during interro-
gation were excluded. the trial judge denied the motioll to 
exclude Henderson 's testimony. Henderson therdore 
testified at trial, and respondent was convicted of rape 
and sentenced to :20 to 40 years· i111prisurnnent. His 
conviction was affirrned by both the Y!iclugan Court of 
Appeals 11 and by the Michigan Supreme Court.12 
Respondent then sought habeas corpus relief in federal 
9-istrict court. That court, noting that respondent had 
6 Tran:,cript of Trial, p. 223, 
• Ibid 
s ibid .. p 224. 
~ flnd. 
'JO ibid 
11 l9 Mich. App. :320, 17:2 N. W. 2d i l:2 (l!:Jti!:l). 
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not received the full Miranda warnings and that the 
police had stipulated Henderson's identity was learned 
only through respondent's answers, "reluctantly" con-
cluded that Henderson's testimony could not be ad-
mitted.13 Application of such an exclusionary rule was 
necessary, the court reasoned, to protect respondent's 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The 
court therefore granted respondent's petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus unless petitioner retried respondent 
within 90 days. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari, - U. S. ·-, 
and now reverse. 
II 
Although respondent's sole complamt is that the police 
failed to advise him That he would be given free counsel 
if unable to afford counsel himself. he did not, and does 
not now, base his arguments for reli~f on a right to coumel 
under the Si"xt1i and Fourteenth Am;1dments. Nor was 
the right to counsel, as such. considered to be persuasive 
by either federal court below. We do not have a situ-
ation such as that presented in Escobedo v. Illinois , 378 
U. S. 478 ( 1964) , where the policemen interrogating the 
suspect had refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer 
who was then present at the police station . As we have 
noted previously, Escobedo is not to be broadly extended 
beyond the facts of that particular case. See Johnson v. 
New Jersey, 384 P. S. 719, 733-7;34 (1966); Kirby v. 
Illinois, 406 U. S. 682, 689 (1972); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 
U. S. 731 , 739 (1969). This case also falls outside the 
rationale of Wade v. United States, 388 U. S. 218, 224 
(1967). where the Court held that counsel was needed at 
a post-mdictment lineup in order to protect "the right 
to a fair trial at which the ,Yitnesses against l the defend-
ant] might be meaningfully cross-exarnwed." Hender~ 
13 852 F, Supp., at 2(18, 
;.f 
f IL 67.b<4 
.:J:Drr fl:. r 
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Bon was fully available for searching cross-exami1l'ation 
at respondent's trial. rd A I-~ 
Respondent's argument, and the opinions of the District 7/o 1-- aM. ~ · 
Court and Court of Appeals, instead rely upon the Fifth <f1!/C1t.~ 
Amendment right against self-incrimination and the safe- /rOM-J M.. ~ ~ 
guards designed in Miranda to secure that right. In brief, ~ J~d ~. 
the position urged upon this Court is that proper regard , -
for the privilege against self-incrimination requires, with 
limited exceptions not applicable here, that all evidence 
derived solely from statements made without full Miranda 
warnings be excluded at a subsequent criminal trial. For 
purposes of analysis in this case we believe that the 
question thus presented is best examined in two separate 
parts. We will therefore first consider whether the police 
c~mduct complained of di~ectly in_fringecf""up~ respond~ 
enys rig!it against self:incrimination or whether it iustea<l 
violated only the prophylactic rules developed to protect 
that right. We will then consider whether the evidence 
derived from this interrogation must be excluded. 
III 
The history of the Fifth Amendment right against self~ 
incrimination, and the evils against which it was directed , 
have received considerable attention iu the opinions of 
this Court. See, e. g. Kastigar v. United States, 406 P . S. 
441 (1972); Miranda Y. Arizona, supra; Murphy v. 
Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Ullmann v. 
United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956); Counselman v. 
Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892) . At this point in our 
history virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the 
concept, if not the language, of the provision that reads ; 
' 'No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself . • .'' This Court's de-
cisions have referred to the right as "the mainstay of our 
adversary sy§tem of criminal justice," Johnson v. Xew 
Jersey, supra, at_ 729, and as" 'one of the great landmark~ 
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in man's struggle to make himself civilized. '" Ullmann, 
supra, at 426. It is not surprising that the constitution 
of virtually every State has a comparable provision. 
VIII Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), 
§ 2252. 
The importance of a right does not, by itself, determine 
its scope, and therefore we must continue to hark back 
to the historical origins of the privilege, particularly the 
evils at which it was to strike. The privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination was developed by painful 
opposition to a course of ecclesiastical inquisitions and 
Star Chamber proceedings occurri11g several centuries ago, 
See Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment; Morgan , The 
Privilege Against Self-Incrirninatioll . 34 Minn . L. Rev_ 1 
(1949); Wigmore. Evidence (McKaughton rev. H/61 ) 
§ 2250. Certainly anyone who reads accounts of those 
investigations, which placed a premium on compelling 
subjects of the investigation to admit guilt from their 
own lips. cannot help but be sensitive to the framers' 
desire to protect citizens against such compulsion. As 
this Court has noted. the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion "was- aimed at a ... far-reaching evil-a recurrence 
of the Inquisitio11 and the Star Chamber, even if not in 
their stark brutality." Ullmam1, supra, at 428. 
Where there has been genuine compulsion of testimony. 
the right has been given broad scope. Although the 
constitutional language in which the privilege is cast 
might be construed to apply only to situations in which 
the prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify against 
himself at his criminal trial. its application has 11ot been 
so limited. The right has been held applicable to pro-
ceedings before a grand jury, Counselman \ Hitchcock, 
142 U. S. 547 (1892) , to civil proceedings, McCarthy v. 
Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34 (1924), to congressional investi~ 
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to juvenile proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) , 
and to other statutory inquiries. Malloy v. Hogan , 378 
U. S. 1 (1964). · The privilege has also been applied 
against the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Malloy, supra. 
The natural concern which underlies many of these 
decisions is that an inability to protect the right at 
one stage of a proceeding may make its invocation useless 
at a later stage. For example, the right of a defendant 
not to testify against himself at his own trial might be 
practically nullified if the prosecution could previously 
have required him to give evidence against himself be-
fore a grand jury. Testimony obtained in civil suits. or 
before administrative or legislative committees. could also 
prove so incriminating that a person giving such testi-
mony might readily be convicted on the basis of those 
disclosures in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 11 
In more recent years this concern-that compelled dis~ 
closures might be used against a person at a later criminal 
trial-has been extended to cases involving police interro-
gation. Before Miranda the principal issue in these cases 
was not whether a defendant had waived his privilege 
against self-incrimination but simply whether his state-
ment was "voluntary. '' In state cases the Court applied 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
examining the circumstances of interrogation to determine 
whether the processes \Vere so unfair or unreasonable as 
to render a subsequent confession involuntary. See, e. g., 
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. 
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 
530 (1940); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560 (1958); 
14 The Court has also held that comme11t on a defendant\, :;ilence 
or refusal to take the witness stand may be an impem1issible penalty 
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Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503 (1963). See also 
Wigmore, Evidence, § 815 et seq. Where the State's 
actions offended the standards of fundamental fairness 
under the Due Process Clause, the State was then de-
prived of the right to use the resulting confessions in 
court . 
Although federal cases concerning voluntary confessions 
often contained references to the privilege against self-
incrimination,"' references which were strongly criticized 
by some commentators, see VIII Wigrnore, Evidence 
(McNaughton rev. 1961), § 2266,11; it was not until this 
1 5 For example in Bram. v. United States , 168 l'. S. 532, 542 
(1897), the Court stated: 
"In criminal tnals. in the courts of the l 1111t•d States, wherever a 
4uestion arises whether a C'onfession 18 mcompetent becam,e 11ot 
voluntary, the is:,me is controlled by t.liat ponion of the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding 
that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness agajnst him,;elf.'" 
As noted in the text the privilege against self-incrimination was not 
held applicable against the States until Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 
(1964) . 
16 W1gmorc states his objection in the following term,,: 
"Today in the United States confession~. and probably even lesi:iel' 
.,;elf-incriminating admissions, are f'Xcluded de~pit e their trustworthi-
ness if coerced. The policies leading to this n•ceut extension of 
the confession rule are quite :;imilar to those underlying the privilege 
against self-incrimination. It is thus not :inrprising that the privi• 
lege, with its unclear boundaries and apparently unending capacity 
for transmogrification and assimilation, is now sometimes invoked 
to effect. exclusion even though the disclosure was not compelled 
from a person under legal compulsion. Distortion of the privilege 
to cover such situations is not neces,;ary. If trustworthy con-
fessions are to be excluded because coerced, it should be done frankly 
as an exception to the principle of § 2183 su.pra tlwt tlw illegality of 
source of evidence is immaterfr1I. It 8hould be donf, as it usually i::, , 
on the ground that the combinat10n of coercion tmd u::;P of the evi-
1.dence in the particular case violates thr relPvant con~titutional due 
proce&'-' <'lause." (Citations omitted.) 
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·court's decision in Miranda that the privilege against 
~ self-incrimination was seen as the principal protection 
· f; a person facing police interrogation. This privilege 
had been maae applicable to the 'States in Malloy " · 
Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 ( 1964), a,nd was thought to offer 
a more comprehensive and less subjective protection than 
the doctrine of previous cases. In Miranda the Court 
examined the facts of four separate cases and stated: 
"In these cases, we might not find the de/ fendants' .c_ 
statements to have been involuntary in traditional 
terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to pro"' 
tect precious Fifth Amendment rights is. of course 
not lessened in the slightest To be sure, the 
records do not evince overt physical coercio11 or 
patent psychological ploys. The fact remai11s that 
in none of these cases did the officers undertake to 
afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of th 
interrogation to insure that the statements were truly 
the product of free choice." 384 U. S .. at 457. 
Thus the Court in .lvliranda, for tlw first tilne. expressly 
declared that the Self-Incrimination Clau~e was appli-
cable to state interrogatio11s_,r_t a police stat10n, and th_at 
a defendant's statements nught be t>xcluded at tnal 
despite their voluntary rharaet<'1 u11d('r t.raditional 
principles. 
To supplement this new doctriue, and to help police 
officers conduct interrogations without facing a continued 
risk that valuable evidence would be lost, the Court in 
J11iranda established a set of s Jecific )rotective uide-
lines, now commonly nown as the Af irrznda rules. The 
Cour ec are t at e prosecutiou may not use state-
ments, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming 
from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it 
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective 
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U. S., at 444. A series of recommended "procedural safe~ 
guards" then followed. The Court in particular stated : 
"Prior to any questioning, the person must be 
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that 
any statement he does make may be used as evidence 
against him, and that he has a right to the presence 
of an attorney, either retained or appointed ." 384 
U. S., at 444. 
The Court said that the defendant, of course, could 
waive these rights, but that any waiver must have been 
made "voluntarily. knowingly and intelligently." 384 
U. S., at 444. 
The Court recognized that t~ procedural safeguimls I 
w~re not themselves rights protected by the ConstitutiQ!l 
but were instead measures to insure that the right 
against self-uicriii1ination was protectea." As tne Court 
remarked: 
"[W]e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily 
requires adherence to any particular solution for the 
inherent compulsions of tlw interrogation process as 
it is presently conducted .'' 384 F . S .. at 467. 
The suggested safeguards were not iutended to "create a 
constitutional straight jacket,., 384 U. S. , at 467, but 





A comparison of the facts in this case ,dth the his-
torical circumstances underlying the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination strongly indicates that the 
police conduct here did not deprive respondent of his 
privilege against self-incrimination as such, but rather 
failed to make available to him the full measure of pro-
(:edural .- •~afeguards associated with tha,t right since 
Miranda. Certainly no one could contend that the inter-
rogation faced by respondent bore any resembl1:1,nce to 
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the historical practices at which the right against self-
incrimination was aimed. The District Court in this 
case noted that the police had "warned [respondent] 
that he had the right to remain silent," 352 F. Supp., 
at 267, and the record in this case clearly shows that 
respondent was informed that any evidence taken could 
be used against him, 1' The record is also clear that 
respondent was asked whether he wanted an attorney 
and that he replied that he did not. 18 Thus, his state• 
rnents could hardly be termed involuntary as that term 
has been defined in the decisions of this Court. Addi~ 
tionally, there were no legal sanctions. such as the threat 




ent had he chosen to remain silent. He was simply not 
exposed to "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation. perjury, /7 JI I J, · uD/1 
or contempt.'' Murphy v. Waterfr011t Commission, 378 r . '-/1..u, 14 ~--- ] 
U.S. 52, 55 (1964) . '--f1A.A'-- ""-' /tJ,tJn§' 
Our determination that the mterrogatiou in this case <YJ1 • ~ ~ . 
iiwolved no compulsion sufficient to breach the right ;,.;..;..i.,t,..;.. __ .. 
against self .incrimination does not mean there was not 
a disregard, albeit an inadvertent disregard, of the pro-
cedural rules established in Miranda. The question for 
decision is how sweeping the judicially imposed conse-
quences of this disregard shall be. Thii,, Court said in 
J.11iranda that statements takeu in violation of the 
Miranda principles must not be used to prove th e prose-
cution's case at trial. That requirement was fully 
complied with by the state court here : respondent's 
statements, claiming that he was with Henderson and 
then asleep during the time period of the crime were not 
admitted against him at trial. This Court has also said, 
in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), that 
the "fruits'' of police conduct which actually infringed 
17 See n 5, supra, 
18 See nn. 3 and 4, supm. 
12 
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a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights must be sup--
pressed.10 But we have already concluded that the 
police conduct at issue here did not abridge respond-
ent's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic 
standards laid down by this Court in Miranda to safe-
guard that privilege. Thus, in deciding whether Hen- ~ {). 
derson's testimony must be excluded, there is no con- ~ . 
trolling precedent of this Court to guide us. We must ".' ~ 
therefore examine the matter as a question of principle, t-J.. ~ l..n4 ~
IV ~~,_. 
Just as the law does no.t require that a defendant £fl. v.,..,,J.._, ,._, I 
1 
receive a perfect trial, only a fair one. it cannot realisti- 1tJ~ «rif/ «~ hC.. 
cally require that policeinen investigating serious crimes ti.... 1l_ ~ ~ 
make no errors whatsoever. The pressures of law · () · 
enforcement and the vagaries of human nature would 
make such an expectation unrealistic. Before we 
penalize police error, therefore, we must consider whether 
the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose. 
We have recently said, in a search and seizure coutext, 
that the exclusionary rule's "prime purpose is to deter 
future unlawful police conduct and thereby to effectuate 
the guarantee of the :Fourth Amendment against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.'' United States v. 
Calandra, slip op., p. 9. We then continued: 
"'The rule is calculated to prevent. not to repair. 
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effective avail-
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard 
19 In Wong Sun the police discm·ered evidence through state-
ments made by the accused after he had been placed under arrest. 
This Court, finding that the arrn~t had occurred without probable 
cause, held that the derivative evidence contd not he introduceq 
against the accused at trial. For the rea::;on~ stated in the text we 
do not believe that Wong Sun controls the case before us, 
'V 
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1t.' Elkins v. United States , 364 U. S. 206, 217 
(1960." 20 United States v; Calandra, slip op., p. 9. 
In a proper case this rationale would seem applicable 
to the Fifth Amendment context as well. _ /) 
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule neces.: 1 ~ 40 ~ 
sarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, ~ ✓ ~ • 
or at the very least, 11eglige~1t conduct whic~ has deprive_d ~ .4~ "1 a, 14 
the defendant of some nght. ~y refusmg to admit ~ '-"'-
evidence _gai~e~ as a result ?f sue~ cond_uct,_ the courts ~~ ~J 
hope to mstil m those particular rnvestigatmg officers; ~ ~.t.-z-., 
bl' in their future counterparts. a greater degree of care 61/4.... h~ 
towards the right of an accused. Where the official o/: ~  
action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the · 34', '' ~
deterrence rationale loses much of its force. ~  
We consider it significant to our decision in this case ~ J- ,4 - · ·-
that the officers' failure to advise. respondent of his right 7 ~rl 
to appointed counsel occurred prior to the decision in p , ·, / J 1 
Miranda!' At the ti111e respondent was questioned thesij ~ I'(... ~ 
police officers were guided, quite rightly, by the principles • .k-,. J,,~. 
established in Escobedo, supra, particularly focusing on P 
the subject's opportunity to have retained counsel with 
him during the interrogation if he chose to do so.22 
20 The opinion also relied upon Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 656 
(1961); Tehan v. United States, ex rel. Shot, 382 F . S. 406, 416 
(1966); a.nd Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 29 (1968) . See slip op., 
p. 9. 
21 Both respondent and the United States, as amicus curiae, urge 
us to decide the broad proposition of whether evidence (''fruits") , 
other than statements of the defendant . obtnined after noncompliance 
with the Miranda rules, must be excluded, regardle:,;s of when the 
interrogation took place. Because this ca::;e allows decision on a 
narrower ground, we leave the bronder question for another day. 
22 As previously noted, the defendant in Escobedo had repe-dtedly 
asked to see his lawyer who was available at the poli ce ::, tation . 
T_hose requests were denied, and the defrndaut ultimate!~· confessed. 
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Thus, the police asked respondent if he wanted counsel, 
and he answered that he did not. The statements actu-
ally made by the respondent to the police, as we have ob-
served, were in fact excluded at trial. Whatever deter-
rent effect on future police conduct the exclusion of those 
statements may have had, we do not believe it would be 
significantly augmented by excluding the testimony of 
the witness Henderson as -well. 
When involuntary statements or the right to self- 1• 
incrimination are involved, a second justification for the 
exclusionary rule also has been asserted: protection of 
the courts from reliance on untrustworthy evidence. ,a 
Cases which involve the Self-lncriminatio11 Clause must, 
by definition, involve au element of coercion, since the 
clause provides only that -a person shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself. Aud cases involving in-
voluntary statements often depict severe pressures which 
may override a particular suspect's insistence on inno-
cence. Fact situations ranging from classical third-degree 
torture, Brown v. Mississippi, to prolonged isolation from 
Escobedo was told he did not have a right to see his lawyer, although 
he had expressly stated his desire to do :<o . 
23 The Court has made clear that the truth or falsity of a state-
ment i,, not the determining factor m the decision whether or not 
to exclude if Jackson v. Denno, 3i8 U. S. 368 (1964) . Thus a 
State which has obtained a coerced or involuntary sta tement cannot 
argue for its admissibility on the ground tlu~t other evidence demon..-
strates its truthfufoess. Ibid. But it also seems clear that coerced 
statements have been regarded with some mistrust. The Court in 
Escobedo, for example, stated that "a system of criminal law enforce-
ment which comes to depend on the 'confession' will , in the long run, 
be less reliable and more subject to abuse" than a system relying 
on independent investigation, 378 U. S., at 489. The Court then 
cited to several authorities concerned with false confessions. 3i8 
U S., at 489, n. 11. Although .completely voluntary confessions 
may, in many cases, advance the carnse of justice and rehabilitation, 
,coerced confessions, by their nature, cannot serve the same ends. 
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family or friends in a hostile setting, Gallegos v. Colorado; 
370 U. S. 49 ( 1962), or to a simple desire on the part of a 
physically or mentally exhausted suspect to have a seem-
ingly endless interrogation e11d , Watts v. Indiana, 338 
U, S. 49 ( 1949) , all might be sufficient to cause a defend-
ant to accuse himself falsely, 
But those situations are a far cry from that presented 
here. The pressures on respondent to accuse himself 
were hardly comparable even with the least prejudicial 
of those pressures which have been dealt with in out' 
cases. More important. the respondent did n9t accuse 
himself. The evidence which the prosecution successfully 
sought to introduce was not a confession of guilt by 
l'espondent, or indeed even an exculpatory statement by 
respondent, but rather the testimony of a third party 
who was subjected to no custodial pressures. There is 
plainly no reason to believe that Henderson's testimony 
is untrustworthy simply because respondent was not ad-
v· d of his right to appointed counsel. Henderson was 
otn ava1 a e at trial and subject to cross-examination 
y responden counsel, and counsel fully used this op~ 
portunity, suggesting in the course of his cross-
examination that Henderson ·s character was less than 
exemplary and that he had been offered illcentives by the 
police to testify against respondent.24 Thus the reli-
ability of his testimony was subject to the normal testing 
process of an adversary trial. 
Respondent contends that an additional reason for ex-
cluding Henderson's testimony is the notion that the 
adversarial system requires "the government in its contest 
with the individual to shoulder the entire load." VIII 
"\Vigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), ~ 2251; 
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission , 378 U. S. 52, 55 
(1964); Miranda v. Arizona, s·upra, at 460. rro 
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the extent that this suggested basis for the ex-
clusionary rule in Fifth Amendment cases may exist 
independently of the deterrence and trustworthiness ra-
tionales, we think it of no avail to petitioner here. Sub-
ject to applicable constitutional limitations, the Govern-
ment is not forbidden all resort to the defendant to make 
out its case. It may require the defendant to give physi-
cal evidence against. himself, see Schmerber v. Californw, 
384 U. S. 757 (1966) ; ' United States v. Dionisio, 410 
1!. S. 1 (1973). and it may use statements which are 
voluntarily given by the defendant after he recives full 
disclosure of the rights offered by 11Iira11da. Here we 
deal not with the offer of defendant's own statements in 
evidence, but only with the testimony of a witness whom 
the police discovered as a result of defendant's state-
ments. This recourse to respondent's voluntary state-
ments does no violence to such elements of the adver-
sarial system as may be embodied in the Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments. 
In summary. we do not think that any single reason 
supporting exclusion of this witness' testimony, nor all 
of them together, are very persuasive. 25 By contrast, 
we find the arguments in favor of admitting the testimony 
quite strong. For, when balancing the interests involved, 
we must weigh the strong interest under any system of 
justice of making available to the trier of fact all con~ 
cededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which either 
party seeks to adduce. In this particular case we also 
25 It has been suggested that courts 8hould exclude evidence 
derived from "lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of 
citizens," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 13 (1968), in recognition of 
"the imperat ive of judicial integrity." Elkins v. United States, 364 
·u. S. 206 , 222 (1960). This rationale, however, is really an a;;simi~ 
lation of the more ,;pecific rationales discussed in thf' tf'xt of this 
opinion, and does not in their absence provide an independent basis 
for excluding challenged evidence. 
t;r,~kl 
IL,_~ r~-
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''must consider society's interest in the effective prosecu-
tion of criminals in light of the protection our pre-
Miranda standards afford criminal defendants." Jenkins 
v. Delaware, 395 U. S. 213, 221 (1969). These interests 
may be outweighed by the need to provide an effective 
sanction to a constitutional right, Weeks v. United States, 
232 U. S. 383 (1914) , but they must in any event be 
valued. Here respondent's own statement, which might 
have helped the prosecution show respondent's guilty 
conscience at trial , had already been excised from the 
prosecution 's case· pursuant to this Court's Miranda de-
cision. To extend the excision further under the cir-
cumstances of this case and exclude relevant testimony 
of a third-party witness would require far more persuasive 
arguments than those advanced by respondent. 
This Court has already recognized that a failure to 
give interrogated suspects full Miranda warnings does 
not entitle the suspect to insist that statements made by 
him be excluded in every conceivable context, In H arR 
ris v. New York , 401 U. S. 222 (1971 ), the Court was 
faced with the question of wheth er the statements of the 
defendant himself, taken without informing him of his 
right of access to appointed counsel, could be used to 
impeach defendant's direct testimony at trial. The Court 
c.oncluded that they could , saying · 
"Some cornmeuts in the Miranda opinion can indeed 
be read as indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled 
statement for any purpose, but discussion of that 
issue was not at all necessary to the Court's holding 
and cannot be regarded as controlling. Miranda 
barred the prosecution from making its case with 
statements of an accused made while in custody 
prior to having or effectively waiving counsel. It 
does not follow from Miranda that evidence inad-
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m chief is barred for all purposes, provided 
of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence 
satisfies legal standards." 401 U. S., at 224. 
We believe that this reasoning is equally applicable 
here. Although Miranda enabled respondent to block 
admission of his own statements, we do not believe that 
it requires the prosecution to refrain from all use of those 
statements, and we disagree with the courts below that 
Henderson's testimony should have been excluded in this 
case. 
Reversed. 
No. 73-482 MICHIGAN v. TUCKER 
Memorandum of MR. JUSTICE POWELL. 
I concur in the result reached by the Court, but do 
so on different grounds.* In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 
U.S. 719, decided one week after Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966), the Court addressed the question whether 
the "additional guidelines" of Miranda should be given 
any retroactive effect. Although the Court purported to 
hold that Miranda "should not·· be applied retroactively," 
384 U.S. at 732, the opinion drew the line at the date of 
commencement of trial rather than the date of the defendant's 
statement or confession to the police. The making of this 
distinction was unnecessary to a decision of the case, as 
both the interrogation and trial of the petitioners before 
the Court had occurred some years before Miranda. Never-
theless, the dictum has since been followed (provide citations). 
No reasons were advanced in Johnson for the volunteered 
assertion that Miranda would apply to trials commenced after 
the announcement of that decision even though the inter-
rogation had long preceded such announcement. Indeed, the 
*I find it unnecessary to reach the issue argued in this case 
whether the Miranda warnings, when applicable to an interroga-
tion are not given, preclude the testimony of a third party 
witness whose identify is disclosed in the course of such 
interrogation. 
2. 
rationale of Johnson would indicate precisely the opposite 
view: 
" ... , retroactive application of Escobedo 
and Miranda would seriously disrupt the 
administration of our criminal laws. It would 
require the retrial or release of numerous 
prisoners found guilty by trustworthy evidence 
in conformity with previously announced con-
stitutional standards (384 U.S. at 731). 
"Future defendants will benefit fuly from 
our new standards governing in custody inter-
rogation, while past defendants may still avail 
themselves of the voluntariness test. Law 
enforcement officers and trial courts will have 
fair notice that statements taken in violation 
of these standards may not be used against an 
accused. (Id. at 372)." 
If this rationale is applied to the present case 
the "new standards'r of Miranda would not be applicable. 
The in-custody interrogation of respondent occurred well 
before the standards were enunciated. No contention is 
made by respondent that his statements were not voluntary, 
and certainly they proved to be trustworthy. Respondent 
identified Henderson as a material witness, and he proved 
to be all of that - though his testimony was not in accord 
with resp ndent's expectations. 
It is fictional to say that the police violated 
Miranda when they interrogated respondent after giving him 
the full warnings required by the then most relevant 
3. 
decision of this Court, Escobedo.* 
fl._.,,.._ 
As admittedlyt\"new standards" prescribed by Miranda, 
(384 U.S. at 732) wereR not in effect at the time, they 
could not have been violated by the police. The reasonj 
most frequently given for the per~ application of the 
Miranda standards or "additional guidelines" (384 U.S. 
at 734) is that they deter improper police conduct. In 
this case, there was no such misconduct. Indeed, the 
police would have been derelict in their duty both to 
society and respondent had they failed to pursue the 
"fruits" of their then lawfuli interrogation. As the 
Michigan Court of Appeals put it: 
"We specifically note that witness Henderson 
was contacted initially by law enforcement 
authorities as an alibi witness on behalf of 
xk the defendant. Had he supported the defendant's 
statement that he was scratched by the flailling 
of a goose, defendant might never have stood 
trial for the crime of what he had been 
convicted. Furthermore, could anyone think 
that the officers had fulfilled their duty 
towards defendant had they chosen not to check 
out his alibi?" Pet. for Cert. at 34 . 
*See Peoijle v. Tucker, 19 Mich. App. 320, 172 N.W. 2d 
712 (196 ), in which the Michi~an Court of Appeals stated 
that at the time of "defendants interrogation on April 
19, 1966, he was advised of his rights as delineated by 
Escobedo v. Illinois, supra. See Petition for Cert, 
p. 28. 
.... ~.. '. ... ... 
4. 
In sum, while agreeing fully with the Court's holding 
in Johnson that Miranda "should not be applied retroactively" 
(384 U.S. at 732), I find no analytical or principled basis 
for the dictum t o the effect that the determinative time 
is commencement of the trial rather than the interrogation 
which elicited t he statements in question. I would no 
longer follow this dictum. A rule without a rational basis, 
and none has been suggested for this one, hardly merits 
precedential respect. 
- \ \ 
~UlJ-rtm.e <qGttrt of t4t'Jilttiteb .;§tafra 
'Jmfasfrmgton. l1). <4. 20~,-1,~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. May 6, 1974 
RE: No. 73-482 Michigan v. Tucker 
Dear Bill: 
I've come to the conclusion that the 
principles of Miranda should not be retro-
actively applied in this case and that the 
reasoning of Johnson v. New Jersey can be 
distinguished. Inst~ad of a dissent, I 
shall therefore in due course circulate an 
opinion concurring in the judgment of the 
Court. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
j 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 73-482 
State of Michigan, l W . f . . h U . d 
P t ·t· On n t o Certiorari tot e mte e 1 10ner 
' States Court of Appeals for the 
v. Sixth Circuit. 
Thomas W. Tucker. 
[May -, 1974] 
Mu. JUSTICE REHNQLI8T delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case presents the question whether the testimony 
of a witness in respondent's state court trial for rape must 
be excluded simply because police had learned the identity 
.of the witness by questioning respondent at a time when 
he was in custody as a suspect. but had not been advised 
that counsel would be appointed for him if he was indi-
gent. The questioning took place before this Court's 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), but 
respondent's trial, at which he was convicted, took place 
afterwards. Under the holding of Johnson v. New Jersey, 
384 U. S. 719 (H)66), therefore, Miranda is appli-
cable to this case. The Vnited 8tates District Court 
for the Eastern District of Michigan reviewed peti~ 
tioners' claim on a petition for habeas corpus and held 
that the testimony must be excluded.1 The Court o! 
Appeals affirmed.2 
I 
On the morning of April 19, 1966, a 43-year-old woman 
in Pontiac, Michigan, was found in her home by a friend 
1 352 F . Supp. 266 (1972). 
;i 4so F, 2d 927 (1973). 
0lated: 
~ulated:_S}8__,./_7~--
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.and coworker, Luther White, in serious condition. At 
the time she was found the woman was tied, gagged, and 
partially disrobed, and had been both raped and severely 
beaten. She was unable to tell White anything about 
her assault at that time and still remains unable to 
recollect what happened. 
While White was attempting to get medical help for 
the victim and to call for the police, he observed a dog 
inside the house. Thi~ apparently attracted White 's at• 
tention for he knew that the woman did not own a dog 
herself. Later, when talking with police ofhcers White 
observed the dog a second time, and police followed the 
dog to respondent's house. Neighbors further connected 
the dog with respondent. 
The police then arrested respondent and brought him 
to the police station for questioning. Prior to the actual 
interrogati011 the police asked respondent whether hl' 
knew for what cri1ne he had been arrested , whether he 
wanted an attorney and whether he understood his 
constitutional rights,3 Respondent replied that he did 
understand the crime for which he ~as arrested, that he 
did not want a.n attorney, and that he understood his 
rights.4 The. police further advised him thnt any state .. 
ments he might make could be used against him at a 
later date in court.5 The police. however. did not advise 
:respondent that he would be furnish<>d counsel free of 
charge if he could not pay for surh services hunself 
The police then questioned respondent about his activ .. 
ities on the night of the rape and assault. Respondent 
replied that during the general time period at issue he had 
first been with one Robert Henderson and then later ai 
home, alone, asleep. The police sought to confirm ihi11 
3 Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, p, fl9, 
1/bid. 
6 lbid., :p. 99-,100, 
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~tory by contacting Henderson, but Henderson's story 
served to discredit rather than to bolster respondent's 
account. Henderson acknowledged that respondent had 
been with him on the night of the crime but said that he 
had left at a relatively early time. Furthermore, Hen.; 
derson told police that he saw respondent the following 
clay and asked him at that time about scratches on his 
face-"asked him if he got hold of a wild one or some• 
thing." 6 Respondent answered , "[S]omething like 
that." 1 Then, Henderson said, he asked respondent 
"[W]ho it was," 8 and respondent said: "[S]ome woman 
lived the next block over," u adding "She is a widow 
woman" or words to that effect.10 
These events all occurred prior to the date on which 
this Court handed down its decision in Miranda v. Ari~ 
zona, 384 U. S. 473, but respondent's trial occurred after-
wards. Prior to trial respondent's appointed counsel 
made a motion to exclude Henderson's expected testimony 
because respondent had revealed Henderson's identity 
without having received full Miranda warnings. Al-
though respondent's own statements taken during interro-
gation were excluded. the trial judge denied the motion to 
exclude Henderson 's testimony. Henderson therefore 
testified at trial, and respondent was convicted of rape 
and sentenced to 20 to 40 years' imprisonment. His 
eonviction was affirmed by both the Michigan Court of 
Appeals 11 and by the Michigan Supreme Court.12 
Respondent then sought habeas corpus relief in federal 
district court. That court, noting that respondent had 
6 Transcript of Trial, p. 223, 
7 lbid. 
8 Ibid., p. 224. 
9 lbid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 19 Mich. App. 320, 172 N. W. 2d 712 (1969), 
12 385 Mich 594, 189 N. W. 2d 290 (1971). 
4 
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not received the full Miranda warnings and that the 
police had stipulated Henderson's identity was learned 
only through respondent's answers, "reluctantly" con-
cluded that Henderson's testimony could not be ad-
mitted.13 Application of such an exclusionary rule was 
necessary, the court reasoned, to protect respondent's 
:Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation. The court therefore granted respondent's peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus unless petitioner 
retri ed respondent within 90 days. The Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed \Ve grantc>d 
certiorari, -, r. S. - , and now rcv<'n•e. 
II 
Although respondent's sole complaint is that the police 
failed to advise him that he would be given free counsel 
if unable to afford counsel himself, he did not, and does 
not now, base his arguments for relief on a right to counsel 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Nor was 
the right to counsel, as such, considered to be persuasive 
by either federal court below. We do not have a situ-
ation such as that presented in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 
U.S. 478 (1964), where the policemen interrogating the 
suspect had refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer 
who was then present at the police station. As we have 
noted previously, Escobedo is not to be broadly extended 
beyond the facts of that particular case. See Johnson v. 
New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 733-734 (1966); Kirby v. 
Illinois, 406 U. S. 682, 689 (1972) ; Frazier v. Cupp, 394 
U. S. 731, 739 (1969). This case also falls outside the 
rationale of Wade v. United States, 388 U. S. 218, 224 
(1967), where the Court held that counsel was needed at 
a post-indictment lineup in order to protect " the right 
to a fair trial at which the witnesses against [ the defend-
ant] might be meaningfully cross-examined." Hender., 
:\3 352 F, Su:pp.1 at 268, 
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son was fully available for searching cross-examination 
at respondent's trial. 
Respondent's argument, and the opinions of the District 
Court and Court of Appeals, instead rely upon the Fifth 
Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination 
and the safeguards designed in Miranda to secure that 
right. In brief, the position urged upon this Court is 
that proper regard for the privilege against compulsory 
self-incrimination requires, with limited exceptions not 
applicable here, that all evidence derived solely from 
statements made without full Miranda warnings be ex--
eluded at a subsequellt criminal trial. For purposes of 
analysis in this case we believe that the question thus 
presented is best examined in two separate parts. We 
will therefore first consider whether the police conduct 
complained of directly infringed upon respondent's right 
against compulsory self-i11crimination or whether it 
instead violated only the prophylactic rules developed 
to protect that right. We will then consider whether 
the evidence derived from this mterrogation must be 
excluded. 
III 
The history of the Fifth Ame11dment right against com-
pulsory self-incrimination, and the evils against which it 
was directed. have received considerable attention in the 
opinions of this Court. See, e. g., Kastigar v. U11ited 
States, 406 l:. S. 441 (1972); Miranda v. Arizona, supra; 
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 "C. S. 52 (1964) ; 
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. ~- 422. 426 (1956); 
Counselman v. Hitchcock , 142 U.S. 547 (1892). At this 
point in our history virtually every schoolboy is familiar 
with the concept, if not the language, of the provision 
that reads: "2S"o person ... shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... '' This 
Court's decisions have referred to the right as ''the main-
stay of our adversary system of criminal justice," Johnson 
0 
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v. Kew Jersey, supra, at 729, and as "'one of the great 
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized.' ,, 
Ullmann, supra, at 426. It is not surprising that the 
constitution of virtually every State has a comparable 
prov1s10n. VIII Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 
1961), § 2252. 
The importance of a right does not, by itself, determine 
its scope, and therefore we must continue to hark back 
to the historical origins of the privilege, particularly the 
evils at which it was to strike. The privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination was developed by pauuul 
opposition to a course of ecclesiastical inquisitions and 
Star Chamber proceedings occurring several centuries ago. 
See Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment; Morgan, The 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1 
(1949); Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. H>61) , 
§ 2250. Certainly anyone who reads accounts of th.Jse 
investigations, which placed a premium on compelling 
subjects of the investigation to admit guilt from their 
own lips, cannot help but be sensitive to the framers' 
desire to protect citizens against such compulsion. As 
this Court has noted, the privilege against self-incrimina,. 
tion "was aimed at a .. . far-reaching evil- a recurrence 
oj the Inquisition and the Star Chamber. even if not in 
their stark brutality." Ullmann, supra, at 428. 
Where there has been genuine compulsion of testimony, 
the right has been given broad scope. Although the 
constitutional language in which the privilege is cast 
might be construed to apply only to situations in which 
the prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify against 
himself at his criminal trial, its application has not been 
so limited. The right has been held applicable to pro-
ceedings before a grand jury, Counselman v. Hitchcock, 
142 U. S. 547 (1892), to civil proceedings, McCarthy v, 
Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34 ( 1924) , to congressional investi-. 
gations, Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 (1957), 
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to juvenile proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967), 
and to other statutory inquiries. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
U. S. 1 (1964). The privilege has also been applied 
against the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Malloy, supra. 
The natural concern which underlies many of these 
decisions is that an inability to protect the right at 
one stage of a proceeding may make its invocation useless 
at a later stage. For example, a defendant's right not to 
be compelled to testify against hirnself at his own trial 
might be practically nullified if tlw prosPcution could 
previously have required him to give evidence against 
himself before a grand jury. Testimony obtained in civil 
suits, or before administrative or legislative committees, 
could"also prove so incriminating that a person com1wllecl 
to give such testimony might readily he eom ictPd on the 
basis of those disclosures in a subsequent crimrnal 
proceeding.1•i 
In more recent years this concern-tha.t compelled dis-
closures might be used against a person at a later criminal 
t rial- has been extended to cases involving police interro-
gation. Before Miranda the principal issue in these cases 
was not whether a defendant had waived his privilege 
agahist compulsory self-incrimination hut simply whether 
his statement ·was "voluntary.'' ln state caf-'es the Court 
applied the Due Process Clause of the Fourt<1enth AmellCl-
ment, examining the circumstances of interrogation to 
determine whether the processes were so unfair or unrea-
sonable as to render a subsequent confession involuntary. 
See. e. g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 F. S. 278 ( 1936); 
Chambers L Florida, 309 V. S. 227 (1940); W hite v. 
'Texas, 310 U. S. 530 (1940); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 
14 The Court has also held that comment on a defemfant's silmce 
or refusal to take the witness stand may be an impermissible penalty 
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U.S. 560 (1958); Haynes\' . Washington, 373 U. S. 503 
(1963). See also Wigmore. Evidence, § 815 et seq, 
Where the State's actions offended the standards of fun .. 
darnental fairness under the Due Process Clause, the 
State was then deprived of the right to use the resulting 
confessions in court. 
Although federal cases concerning voluntary confessions 
often contained references to the privilege against 
rompulsory self-incrimination, L,; references which were 
strongly criticized by some commentators. '-ef' VIIr Wig-
more, Evidence (McXaughtu11 rev. H)Ol). ~ :2:2(:i6,"· it was 
15 For example in Bram v. United States, 168 U . S. 532, 542 
(1897) , the Court stated: 
"In cnminal trials. m the courts of the United States, wherever a. 
question ari~es whether n confession is incompetent bccnu~e uot 
voluntary, the i~sue is coutrolled by that port10n of the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United State,,, commanding 
that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness agamst himself.'" 
As noted in thf' text the privi)('ge ngain~t compubory :,e)f-inrrimina-
tion was not held applicable again~t the State,- until Malloy,·. Hogan. 
378 U. S. 1 (196-!). 
16 Wigmore states his ob.iection in the following term:": 
"Today in the United States confessions. and probabl~· even les,-er 
self-incriminating admissions, are exch1ded despite their trustworthi-
ness if coerced . The polirie" leadmg to tlnl< receut extern,ion of 
the confession rule are quite "nmlar to tho~(' mHlcrlYing thr privilege. 
against. self-incrimination. It is thus not. >'urprismg that the privi-
lege, with its unclear boundaries and appnrently unending capacity 
for transmogrification and nssimilation, is now sometim~ invoked 
to effect exclusion even though the disclosure was not. compelled 
from a person under legal compulsion. Distortion of the privilege 
to cover such situations i~ not necessary. If trustworth~• con-
fessions are to be excluded because coerced, it ,,;hould be done frankly 
as an exception to the principle of § 2183 suvra tlrnt the illc>gality of 
source of evidence i:,1 immaterial. It should be done, as it usually is, 
on the ground that the combi1rntion of coercion a11d u:;e of the evi., 
.dence in the particular case violates the relevant con,;titutional dt1e 
proce~ clause," (Citations ODJitted.) 
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110t until this Court's decision in Miranda that the privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination was seen as the 
principal protection for a person facing police interroga-
tion . This privilege had been made applicable to the 
States in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 ( 1964) . and wai 
thought to offer a more comprehensive and less subjective 
protection than the doctrine of previous cases. In 
Miranda the Court examined the facts of four separate 
cases and stated: 
"ln thesP casPs, we might not find thr def r11d a11 t:-' 
statements to have been involuntary in traditiomll 
terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to pro• 
tect precious Fifth Amendment rights is, of course, 
not lessened in the slightest. . . . To be sure, the 
records do not evince overt physical coercion or 
patent psychological ploys. The fact remains that 
in none of these cases did the officers undertake to 
afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the 
interrogation to msure that the statements were truly 
the product of free choice." 384 U. S. , at 457. 
Thus the Court in Miranda, for the first time, expressly 
declared that the Self-Incrimination Clause was appli-
cable to state interrogations at a police station, and that 
a defendant's statements might be excluded at trial 
despite their voluntary character under traditional 
principles. 
To supplement this new doctrine, and to help police 
officers conduct interrogations without facing a continued 
risk that valuable evidence would be lost, the Court in 
Miranda established a set of specific protective guide-
lines, now commonly known as the Miranda rules. The 
Court declared that "the prosecution may not use state-
ments, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming 
from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it 
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective 
:ill) 
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to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." 384 
U. S .. at 444. A series of recommended "procedural safe-
guards" then followed . The Court in particular stated : 
"Prior to any questioning. the person must be 
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that 
any statement he does make may be used as evidence 
against him, and that he has a right to the presence 
of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 384 
U. S., at 444. 
The Court said that the defendant, of course, could 
waive these rights, but tha.t any ,•.raiver must have been 
made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." 38.4 
U. S .. at 444-. 
The Court recognized tha.t these procedural safeguards 
were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution 
but were instead measures to insure that the right 
against compulsory self-incrimiuation was protected. As 
the Court remarked: 
"[W]e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily 
requires adherence to any particular solution tor the 
inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as 
it is presently conducted '' 384 "G. S., at 467. 
The suggested safeguards were not intended to "create a 
.constitutional straightjacket," 384 U. S., at 467, but 
rather to provide practical reinforcement for the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination. 
A comparison of the facts in this case with the his-, 
torical circumstances underlying the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination strongly indicates that the 
police conduct here did not deprive respondent of hh, 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as such, 
but rather failed to make available to him the full measure 
of procedural safeguards associated with that right since 
Miranda. Certainly no one could contend that the inter-
rogation faced by respondeu t bore any resemblance to 
73-482-0PINI0N 
MICHIGAN v. TUCKER Ii 
the historical practices at which the right against compul-
sory self-incrimination was aimed. The District Court in 
this case noted that the police had "warned [respondent] 
that he had the right to remain silent;' 352 F . Supp., 
at 267. and the record in this case clearly shows that 
respondent was informed that a.ny evidence taken could 
be used against him.17 ·The record is also clear tha't 
respondent was asked whether he wanted an attorney 
and that he replied that ·he did not. 18 Thus, his sta~ .. 
ments could hardly be termed imolt.ntary as that tPrm 
has been defined m the decisions of this Co urt. Addi-
·tionally. there were no legal sanctions. such a::, the threat 
, of contempt. which could have been applied to respond-
ent had he chosen to remain silent. He was simply not 
exposed to "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, 
or contempt." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 37, 
u. s. 52, 55 (1964). 
Our determination that the interrogation '.n thi~ case 
involved no compulsion sufficient to breach the nght 
against compulsory self-i 11rrimi11atio11 dot''- not 1ue>a1 therP 
was not a disregard, albPit an inadvertellt di:m•gard, o·· tlw 
procedural ruks lat(•r estabfo,IH•d 111 Jfm!llda The qurs-
tion for decision is how sweeping the ,1udicially rn1posed 
consequences of this disregard shall be. This Court said 
in Miranda that statements taken in violatw11 of thP 
Miranda principles n'iust not be used to prove the prose-
cution 's case at trial, That requirement was fully 
complied with by the state court here : respondent's 
statements, claiming that he was with Henderson an'd 
then asleep during the time period l f the cri 11t •re uot 
admitted against him at trial, This Court has a.Iso said, 
in lVong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), that 
· the "fruits"· of police conduct which actually infring~d 
11.- Set- n, 5 supra. 
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a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights must be sup-
pressed.10 But we have already concluded that the 
police conduct at issue here did not abridge respond-
ent's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic 
standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to 
safeguard that privilege. Thus. in deciding whether Hen-
derson 's testimony must be excluded. there is no con-
t rolling precedent of this Court to guide us. We must 
therefore examine the matter as a question of principle, 
IV 
Just as the law does not require that a defendant 
receive a perfect t rial, only a fair one, it cannot realisti-
cally require that policemen investigating serious crimes 
make no errors whatsoever. The pressures of law 
enforcement and the vagaries of humaJJ nature ,,,,ould 
make such an expectation unrealistic. Before we 
penalize police error. therefore. we must consider whether 
the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose. 
We have recently said, in a search and seizure context, 
that the exclusionary rule's "prime purpose is to deter 
fu ture unlawful police conduct and thereby to effectuate 
the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment agamst un-
reasonable sea.rches and seizures." ( nited States v. 
Calandra, slip op., p. 9. We then coutlnued: . · 
"'The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair, 
Its purpose 1s to deter-to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effective avail-
able way-by removing the incentive to disregarq 
19 In Wong Sun the police discoYrred pv1denrc through ::;tato~ 
ments made by the acrused after he had bren placP<l 11nder arre-st. 
T his Court, finding that the arre~t had occu rred without probable 
cam,e, held that the derivative end<·nce could not be rntroduce<l 
against the accrn,ed at trial For the reason,, ,;t"tcd 111 the text we 
do not believe that Wong .S1m c,mtrol~ the ca:;e hefore us. 
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it.' Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 217 
(1960." 20 United States v. Calandra, slip op., p. 9. 
ln a proper case this rationale would seem applicable 
to the Fifth Amendment context as well. 
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule neces~ 
sarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, 
or at the very least, negligent conduct which has deprived 
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit 
evidence gained as a result of si1ch contluct, the court!% 
hope to instil in those particular investigating officers, 
or in their future counterparts, a r 
towards the ri h ccused 
action :b, .Q0wewr, the 
deterre 1ce rationale losPs 1uvql;i 0f its force. 
We consider it significant t<' our dE>ci• -i,)11 in ~h•:, casi> 
that the officers' failure to advise respondent of his right 
to appointed counsel occurred prior to the decision in 
Miranda ~ Although we have been urged to resolve• the 
broad questioh of whethrr evid<>nce derived from 8tate-
ments takrn m violation of the Mfronda rules ll\USt hf' 
excluded regard less of when tlit int01-rog: tio11 took place~ 
we mstead place our holchng 011 a narrower ground, 
For at the time respondellt was questioued these 
police officers were guided, quite rightly, by the principles 
established in Escobedo, supra, particularly focusing on 
the subject's opportunity to have retained counsel with 
him during the foterrogatfon if he chose to do so,2~ 
20 The opinion also relied upon Mapp v. Ohio, 367 e. S. 643, 656 
fl961); Tehan v. United States, e;r rel. Shot . 382 U S. 406, 416 
(1966) ; and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S, 1, 29 (1968). See blip op.
1 
p. 9. 
21 Brief for lfnitl'd State~ 1~ Amicus Curiae p. ;31 et .~eq.; Brief 
for Re,,pondl'nl, p. 9 et Sl'f/ 
22 As previously noted, the defendant in Escobedo hac!' repeatedly 
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Thus, the police asked respondent if he wanted counsel, 
and he answered that he did not. The statements actu-
ally made by the respondent to the police, as we have ob-
served. were excluded at trial in accordance \vith Johnson \ 
v. New Jersey, supra. ·whatever deterrent effect on fu-
tur<:' police conduct the exclusion of those statements may 
have had. we do not believe it would be significantly aug-
mented by excluding the testimony of the wituess Hen-
derson as well. 
,Yhen involuntary statenwnts or the right against com- 1 
]JUlsory self-incrimination are involved, a seco11d justifica-
tion for the exclus10nary rule also has h<'PU as~t•rte<L 
protection of the courts from reliance on untrustworthy 
evidence. 03 Cases which involve the Self-Incrimination 
Clause must. by definition , involve an element of coercion, 
since the clause provides only that a person shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself. And cases 
involving /\. statements often depict sev<:'re pr<:'ssures 
which may override a particular suspect·s rnsiste1Jce 011 
lnOb~tM~ 
I\ 
Those reques1:5 ,,;ere denied. and the defendant ultmiately confo,,~ed. 
Thus, in dir<'c t. contrast to the ~ituation here, the defendant in 
Escobedo was told he did not have a right to see his lawyer, although 
he had expres;::I~· stated his drsire to do ::;o. 
23 The Court has made clear that the truth or faJ:51ty of a state.. 
ment is not the det ermining factor in the decision whether or not 
to exclude it: Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964). Thus u. 
Stute which has obtained a coerced or involuntary sta1emrnt cannot 
argue for its admissibility on the ground that other f'\·idence demon-
strates its truthfuTness. 1bid. But it also seems clear that coerced 
sta tements have been regarded with some mistru~t. Tlw Court in 
Escobedo, for example, stated that ''a system of enminal law enforce-
ment which come;: to depend on the 'confession' will, in the long run, 
be less reliable and more subject to ahuse" than a system relymg 
on independent investigation, 378 U. S., at 489. The Court theft 
cited to several authorities concerned with false confessions. 378 
U. S., at 489, n. '11. Althotigh completely voluntary confessions 
may, in many cases, advance the cause of justice and rehabilitation, 
coerced confe;:;sions·, by their lll\ture, cirnnot sorve the same ends, 
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innocence. Fact situations ranging from classical third-
degree torture, Brown v. Mississippi, supra, to prolonged 
isolation from family or friends in a hostile setting, Gal-:. 
legos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). or to a simple de-
sire on the part of a physically or mentally exhausted 
suspect to have a seemingly endless interrogation endJ 
·watts v. Indiana, 338 U. 8. 49 ( 1949); all might be suffi .. 
t:ient to cause a defendant to accuse hiinself falsely. 
But those situations are a far cry from that presented 
here. The pressures on respondent to accuse himself 
were hardly compa,ra,ble even with the least prejudicial 
of those pressures which have been dealt with in our 
cases. More important, the respondent did not accuse 
himself. The evidence which the prosecution successfully 
sought to introduce was not a confession of guilt by 
respondent, or indeed even an exculpatory statement by 
respondent. but rather the testimony of a third party 
who was subjected to no custodial pressures. There is 
plainly no reason to believe that Henderson's testimony 
is untrustworthy simply because respondent was not ad-
vised of his right to appointed counsel. Henderson was 
both available at tna] and subject to cross-examination 
by respondent's counsel, and counsel fully used this op-
portunity, suggesting in the course of his cross-
examination that Henderson's character \\ m, less than 
exemplary and that he had been offered rncentives by the 
police to testify against respondent. 2• Thus the reli-
ability of his testimony was subject to the normal testing 
process of an adversary trial. 
Respondent contends that an additional reason for ex-
cluding Henderson's testimony is the notion that the 
adversarial system requires "the government in its contest 
with the individual to shoulder the entire load." VIII 
Wigmore, Evidence (McKaughton rev. 1961), § 2251; 
24 Transcript of Trial, p. 226-234. 
16 
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Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U. S. 52, 55 
'(1964); Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 460. To 
the extent that this suggested basis for the ex-
clusionary rule in Fifth Ani'endment cases may exist 
independently of the deterrence and trustworthiness rae 
tionales, we think it of no avail to petitioner here. Sube 
ject to applicable constitutional limitations, the Governe 
rnent is not forbidden all resort to the defendant to make 
out its case. It may require the defendant to give physie 
cal evidence against himself, see Schrnerber v. Californw., 
384 U. S. 757 (1966); United States v. Dionisio, 410 
U. S. 1 (1973), and it may use statements which are 
voluntarily given by the defendant a(ter he rec1ves full 
disclosure of the rights offered by Miranda. Here we 
deal not with the offer of defendant's own statements in 
evidence, but only with the testimony of a witness whom 
the police discovered as a result of defendant's state-
ments. This recourse to respondent 's voluntary state-
ments does no violence to such elements of the adver-
sarial system as may be embodied in the .Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments. 
In summary, we do not think that any single reason 
supporting exclusion of this witness' testimony, nor all 
of them together, are very persuasive.25 By contrast, 
we find the arguments in favor of admitting the testimony 
quite strong. For. when balancing the interests involved, 
we must weigh the strong interest under any system of 
justice of making available to the trier of fact all con-
25 It has been ,mggested that courts ~hould exclude evidence 
derived from "lawless inva~ions of the ronstitu1 ional rights of 
citizem,," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 13 (1968), m rrrognit10n of 
"the imperative of judicial integrHy." Elkins v. United States. 364 
U. S. 206, 222 ( 1960) . This rationale, however, is really an assimi-
fation of the more ,;pec1fic rationales di::;cussed in the text of thii 
opinion, and does not in their abscncr providr an independent bnsi" 
for excluding challenged evidence. 
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'·cededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which either 
party seeks to adduce. In this particular case we also 
"must consider society's interest in the effective prosecu .. 
tion of criminals in light of the protection our pre-
Miranda standards afford criminal defendants." Jenkins 
v. Delaware, 395 U. S. 213. 221 (1969). These interests 
may be outweighed by the need to provide an effective 
sanction to a constitutional right, Weeks v. United States, 
232 U. S. 383 (1914), but they must in any even t be 
valued. Here respondent's own statement, which might 
have helped the prosecution show respondent's guilty 
conscience at trial, had already been excised from the 
prosecution's case pursuant to this Court's Johnson de- I 
cision. To extend the excision further under the cir~ 
cumstances of this case and exclude relevant testimony 
of a third-party witness would require far more persuasive 
arguments than those advanced by respondent. 
This Court has already recognized that a failure to 
give interrogated suspects fu ll Miranda warnings does 
not entitle the suspect to insist that statements made by 
him be excluded in every conceivable context. In Har-
ris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971), the Court was 
faced with the question of whether t.he statements of the 
defendant himself, taken without informing him of his 
right of access to appointed counsel, could be used to 
impeach defendant's direct testimony at trial. The Court 
concluded that they could, saying: 
"Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed 
be read as indicating a, bar to use of an uncounseled 
statement for any purpose. but discussion of that 
issue was not at all necessary to the Court's holding 
and cannot be regarded as controlling. Miranda 
barred the prosecution from making its case with 
statements of an accused made while in custody 
prior to having or effectively waiving counsel. It 
18 
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does not follow from Miranda that evidence inad-
missible against an accused in the prosecution 's case 
in chief is barred for all purposes, provided 
of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence 
satisfies legal standards." 401 U. S., at 224. 
We believe that this reasoning is equally applicable 
here. Although Johnson enabled respondent to block I 
admission of his own statements, we do not believe that 
it requires the prosecution to refrain from all use of those 
statements, and we disagree with the courts below that 
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